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Abstract
This paper traces the evolution of employment relations in the u.s. auto
industry over the post World War II period with particular emphasis on
recent developments. There is a strong movement toward growing variation
in employment relations within both the assembly and parts sectors of the
auto industry. Variation appears both through the spread of more contin-
gent compensation and team systems of work organization. There is also
wide variety across plants and industry segments in basic employment
systems including low wage, human resource, Japanese-oriented, andjoint
team-based approaches. Declining unionization is a particularly strong
influence in the parts sector although nonunion operations have now spread
to the assembly sector. While these trends are well illustrated by develop-
ments in the auto industry, they are trends common to other parts of the
u.s. economy.
Spl.
pre
cor
par
ow
nor
Unt
pIa
pro
ods
wit
mu
me:
fac
An
attr
ran
* Jack Sheinkman Professor of Collective Bargaining and Director of the Institute of
Collective Bargaining, NYSSILR, Cornell University pre
Industrial Relations in the U.S. Automobile Industry 193
te of
Introduction
The auto industry has historically played a prominent role in American
collective bargaining, introducing many now common features - multi-year
contracts with cost-of-living-adjustment escalators and built-in annual real
wage increases, supplementary unemployment benefits, '30 and out' pen-
sions, and quality of working life (QWL) programs -and upholding a strong
structure of pattern bargaining for many years. I In the 1980s, automotive
labor relations was again in the forefront in taking actions to modify this
long-established model, under pressure from both foreign and domestic
competitors and from new production models linked to new human resource
practices.
The cumulative outcome of these pressures has been increased diversity
and decentralization of employment relations. Modifications of the indus-
try's collective bargaining model have included so-called 'concessionary'
contracts that replace traditional bargaining formulas with company-spe-
cific profit-sharing plans and work rule changes; extensive new income and
job security programs to cope with industry restructuring; joint labor-man-
agement efforts around training and quality; and the use of new work
structures at the shop floor level, such as teams combined with very few job
classifications, that challenge the principles of 'job control' unionism.
Diversity across companies in industrial relations practices also is being
spurred through the expansion of Japanese ownership and influence and the
prominence of new models of worker and union participation. As Japanese
companies became owners or co-owners (along with American company
partners) of new assembly plants, the fact that virtually all of the solely-
owned Japanese plants operated without a union introduced the threat of
non-union operations to what had been one of the few remaining fully
unionized sectors in the American economy. The presence of Japanese
plants in the United States also gave impetus to the diffusion of 'lean
production' , a Toyota-derived model combining new manufacturing meth-
ods such as just-in-time inventory systems and statistical process control
with new human resource practices focused on worker motivation and
multiski11ing. Meanwhile, the extreme form of worker and union involve-
ment (even in business decisions) that emerged in the expanding Saturn
facility, a subsidiary of General Motors, was viewed by many as an
American alternative to (or extension of) lean production, and quickly
attracted both proponents and opponents among management and union
ranks.
Variation in employment relations in the auto parts sectors includes
pressures similar to those found in the assembly sector plus more extensive
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growth in non-union employment. Linked to the deunionization occurring
in the auto parts sector is the spread of low wage employment practices.
Before describing these recent developments in automotive industrial
relations more fully, the industry and its innovative history of labor-man-
agement relations are reviewed. The next section includes a description of
the primary parties involved in U.S. automotive labor relations: the unions
and the companies. Subsequent sections then focus on the changing nature
of industrial relations in the auto assembly and auto parts sectors.
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Unions, Companies and the Competitive Environment
The Unions
The United Automotive Workers (VA W) is the primary union representing
workers in the auto industry. The International Union of Electricians (IUE)
also represents some hourly auto workers (primarily in the electrical prod-
uct parts plants). By the late 1940s the UAW had organized all hourly
workers in the companies that assembled cars and trucks. Until 1985, the
UAW was an international union as it included Canadian auto workers. In
1985, the Canadian auto workers voted to secede and a separation agree-
ment was negotiated between the U.S. and Canadian parts of the UAW to
form the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW).
The UAW is a large and fairly centralized union. The internal structure
of the union includes departments organized along company lines in the
auto industry and an agricultural implements department. National union
staff coordinate bargaining within each department and also assist in the
implementation of benefits, employee assistance, health and safety, and
quality of working life programs.
The central figure in the union over the post war period was Walter
Reuther who along with his brothers was active in the union's sit down
strikes and organizing efforts in the 1930s. Reuther served as president of
the UAW from 1947 until his death in 1970. During his tenure, Reuther led
a coalition (the 'administrative caucus') that dominated the national affairs
of the union and while he was alive, Reuther's influence and imagination
encouraged an innovative spirit within auto bargaining. Under Reuther's
guidance the UAW also was very active in national and local politics and
a strong supporter of the Democratic Party . Yet, even with the dominance
of the Reuther coalition, the UAW historically has had strong democratic
traditions which appeared recently in the debates occurring within the UAW
between the 'New Directions Movement' and the' Administrative Caucus'.
These debates are reviewed later in this paper.
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Company Location Producfn 1989 1995 Unionized
Began Product'n Product'n
Honda Marysville, OH 1982 363,2741 551,5331 No
Nissan Smyrna, TN 1983 238,641 465,819 No
New United Motor Fremont, CA 1984 192,471 349,503 Yes
Manufacturing
(Toyota and General Motors)
Mazda (withFord) Flat Rock, MI 1987 216,501 148,9322 Yes
Diamond-Star
(Mitsubishi and Chrysler) Normal, IL 1988 90,741 218,161 Yes
Toyota Georgetown, KY 1988 151,099 389,048 No
Subaru-Isuzu Lafayette, IN 1989 11,160 389,048 No
Honda East Liberty, OH 1989 (1) (1) No
BMW Spartansburgh, SC 1994 11,876 No
1 Honda Marysville production level includes Honda East liberty as well.
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The Companies
The American assembly companies are commonly referred to as the 'Big
Three' -General Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler. They produce a number
of car and truck parts and they assemble these parts into final vehicles,
although the extent to which these assemblers are 'vertically integrated'
(use parts produced in their own plants) varies. Estimates of the degree of
integration in 1990 are GM-70%, Ford-40%, and Chrysler-30%. The Big
Three are completely unionized, and their national (company-wide) collec-
tive bargaining agreements cover the companies' final assembly and parts
plants. In addition, the Saturn Corporation, a subsidiary of GM, operates a
sizeable unionized auto assembly complex in Tennessee, covered under a
separate contract that differs substantially from the national GM agreement.
There are also a number of assembly plants with Japanese ownership
involvement, referred to in the industry and in this paper as the 'transplants' .
Table I contains summary information on these plants. The three unionized
transplants acquired this status by virtue of their joint venture arrangements
with U.S. companies. These arrangements have been somewhat fluid; they
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Table 1. Japanese AutomobileAssembly Plants Based in the United States
2 Mazda production was 246,991 in 1994. Production was slowed in 1995 due to excess inventories.
Sources: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association and Automotive News (Detroit, MI., Crain
Communications, Inc.), various issues. Christopher J. Singleton 'Auto Industry Jobs in the 1980's: A
Decade of Transition,' Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 115, No.2, February 1992, pp. 18-27. The 1995 figures
include cars and trucks and are from an unpublished table compiled by General Motors.
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have been altered at two of these plants since they opened. The contracts at
these plants, like at Saturn, represent a substantial departure from the
national VA W-Big Three agreements.Five of the transplants arenon-union
plants, and they appear to represent the dominant trend for new investment,
with both BMW and Mercedes-Benz now building new non-union plants.
Japanese companies have historically been much less vertically inte-
grated than the Big Three, and this pattern is also true for the transplants.
Estimates indicate that Toyota, Nissan, and Mazda are the most vertically
integrated of the Japanese companies, at 30%, and that Suzuki is the least
vertically integrated,at 16%;the industryaverage is just under 25%. The
transplants initially sourced many of their parts from Japan, but have made
a strong effort in recent years, accelerated by political pressures related to
the U.S. - Japan trade deficit, to increase the 'local content' of their
U.S.-built vehicles.
The Competitive Environment
From 1946until 1979,the auto industry in the U.S. was on a prosperous
growth path, even in the face of the industry's periodic sharp cyclical
swings. Over these years domestic production of cars and trucks increased
from 5 to 13million vehicles. From 1946 to 1979 the number of production
workers grew 20% and periodically fluctuated substantially along with
vehicle production. The combination of large vehicle output growth and
modest employment growth was due to the significant productivity gains
accomplishedby the industry.This productivityand output growthhelped
produce strong profit figures for the industry and provided support for
substantial growth in auto workers' real earnings.
From the end of World War II until the late 1970s, the economic
environment of the auto industry was conducive to steady improvements
and general stability in labor relations. Three environmental factors were
critical - growth in domestic auto sales, a low level of imported vehicle
sales, and a high degree of unionization. Yet, in the early 1980s, a labor and
management that had grown accustomed to long run growth in total vehicle
sales and profits were confrontedby a numberof fundamentalchanges in
the auto market.
One important aspect of the change was an increase in international
competition in the form of increased vehicle imports. While the level of
imports increased steadily during the 1960s and 1970s from a post-war low
of 5% in 1955, it surged during the 1980s. The total import share of
American new car sales rose from 21.9% in 1979 to 30.7% in 1987, before
falling back to 26.4% in 1990.
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In the early 1980s American auto makers also confronted sizeable
declines in sales induced by a sluggish American economy. From 1979 to
1982 employment in the auto industry (SIC 371) declined by 29.4% (from
990,400 to 699,300). Ford and Chrysler were hardest hit during this down-
turn. Then in mid 1983, auto sales began to rebound strongly and employ-
ment in the industry and the financial status of the auto assemblers markedly
improved. By 1985 employment had recovered to 883,500; these numbers
reflect not only the recovery of the Big Three but also the strong growth in
transplant employment during the early 1980s. Profits also rebounded; in
1983 and 1984, the combined profits of the Big Three (GM, Ford and
Chrysler) were, respectively, $6.3 billion and $9.8 billion, and the Big Three
continued to be profitable on through the 1990s.
Despite the return to profitability in the mid-1980s, the Big Three faced
increasing competition not only from imports but also from the sizeable
growth in Japanese transplant auto production. Japanese transplant car sales
grew from zero in 1982 to 14.4% of the U.S. market in 1990, with transplant
sales projected to rise to a 20% share of the American market by the turn
of the century.
When a sluggish economy returned in the early 1990s, it had dramatic
effects on both employment and profits among the Big Three. By 1991, auto
industry employment was down to 789,000; most ofthis drop reflected job
losses for the Big Three, since the transplants continued to bring new
capacity on-line during this period. In 1991 financial losses in the core
automotive businesses at GM, Ford and Chrysler, respectively were, $5.2
billion, $1.9 billion, and $0.8 billion. GM's losses led to the company's
decision to close 22 plants by 1995 and cut white and blue collar employ-
ment by 80,000.
Then in 1993 profits rebounded strongly at the Big Three with Chrysler
performing particularly favorably. Along with this sales and profit rebound,
employment also rebounded, although not as strongly as the auto companies
made extensive use of overtime (particularly at Ford and Chrysler) and
benefited from productivity improvements. Some good news for American
companies came in the early 1990s with a small but significant increase in
Big Three market share, to 64.4% in 1992, brought on by sluggish sales of
vehicles imported from Japan, partly due to an unfavorable exchange rate,
and the Big Three's successful unveiling of some popular new products and
willingness to show price restraint to gain sales.
Even in the face of periodic profit rebounds, the increase in international
and domestic competition led to sizeable declines in employment at the Big
Three and VA W membership. From 1978 to 1990, the number of hourly
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jobs at the Big Three declined by 39% (from 740,000 to 455,000). Mean-
while, UAWmembershipdeclined37% from 1979to 1990(from 1,510,000
to 950,000).2
In addition to intensified competitive pressures, the economic environ-
ment of the U.S. auto assemblers was altered from the 1980s on through the
Big Three's decision to forge coproduction agreements with their Japanese
counterparts, as noted above. The primary motivation for the U.S. compa-
nies was to fill gaps in their product lines, particularly for small cars. Yet,
the Big Three have also been influenced, to varying degrees, by the desire
to use these co-owned but Japanese-managed plants to experiment with new
production systems and to develop demonstration models for their wholly-
owned plants. The importance of the transplants for industrial relations
arises from the fact that they utilize innovative practices in both work
organization, employee involvement, and manufacturing practice (dis-
cussed below) and that the plants solely built by the Japanese are unorgan-
ized.
Also significant for collective bargaining has been the formation of more
extensive linkages between the assembler companies and their parts sup-
pliers. Most assemblers dramatically reduced the number of their parts
suppliers and initiated longer term contracts with the select group of
suppliers that remained. At the same time, they increased the percentage of
the parts purchased from non-captive suppliers through increased outsour-
cing from their wholly-owned 'inside' suppliers. The immediate effect of
this trend was to increase the pressure for cost reduction on the parts plants
owned by the assemblers, and to reduce union density in the auto parts
sector, since the vertically-integrated suppliers are 100% unionized, while
the U.S.-owned independent sector is about 50% unionized and the Japa-
nese supplier transplants are nearly 100% non-union. The formation of
stronger links across the assembly companies and between assemblers and
parts suppliers eventually also may produce complicated problems regard-
ing bargaining structure and union jurisdiction.
As the level of inventory held by the Big Three dropped during the
1980s, the interdependence of assembler and supplier plants increased
dramatically, affecting labor"relations in unpredictable ways. For instance,
while the lean buffers of Just-In-Time (TIT) provide an incentive for
suppliers to avoid labor conflict that might interrupt parts deliveries (and
for assemblers to do business with suppliers who can manage labor relations
effectively), the greater interdependence between assembly and parts plants
also gives a new potential source of strike leverage.
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Analysis of the changing nature of employment relations in the U.S. auto
industry requires separate consideration of the assembly and independent
parts sector as the timing and extent of non-un ion growth differs in the two
sectors, although there are commonalities in the pattern of developments
across the auto industry. The independent parts sector excludes the assem-
bly and parts operations within the Big Three automobile companies and
the auto parts production carried out within other companies that include
assembly operations (the Japanese and German 'transplant' firms). The
Japanese and German transplants have made a significant contribution to
the growing variation in employment relations in the U.S. auto industry
because the transplants operate on a non-union basis. Furthermore, as
described in more detail later, the work practices in the Japanese transplants
plants follow a 'Japanese-oriented pattern' and have served as a model for
firms in many other industries. The programmatic details of work practice
implementation and operation differ significantly across the transplants,
contributing another important element to the growing variation in employ-
ment relations in the U.S. auto industry.
In the assembly and independent parts sectors, respectively, the diversity
in employment relations brought about through the growth of non-union
operations is examined first. Then the analysis focuses on the variation that
is appearing within the union and non-union sectors.The analysis of with in
sector variation (union and non-union) distinguishes between the variation
appearing in worker earnings and the variation surfacing in work practices.
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Industrial Relations in the Auto Assembly Sector
The Non-union Transplant Challenge to the Big Three
One of the key sources of growth in variation in the employment relations
in auto assembly plants in the United States has been the growth of
non-union auto assembly plants. Until the start-up of Japanese owned
transplants, the auto assembly sector had remained one of the key com-
pletely unionized sectors in the United States. The assembly plants of the
Big Three auto companies had been organized in the late 1930s and 1940s
by the VA W. Collective bargaining in the Big Three companies then led to
substantial growth in the wages and fringe benefits received by auto workers
and established the VA Was one of the most pivotal unions in the country.
The union status of the assembly plants in the Big Three was challenged
in the 1970s through GM's southern strategy which entailed the opening of
non-union plants in the South. However, by the early 1980s the non-union
GM assembly plants in the South were organized, in large part through the
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automatic ('accretion') procedures the VA W won from GM after the union
threatened to withdraw from the joint programs that were simultaneously
spreading in GM's unionized plants and threatened job actions at GM's
other plants if the issue of union recognition was not settled. (Katz, 1985:
90)
Of more lasting importance was the fact that in its non-union southern
strategy plants GM first utilized its.' operating team' concept. This proved
to be an important testing ground for concepts GM later spread to its other
plants. The operating team system includes a team form of work organiza-
tion with very few job classifications and a lessening in the role played by
seniority, and contrasts sharply with traditional work practices used in the
union sector.
The growth of non-union Japanese and German auto transplants has
proved to be a particularly troubling problem for the UAWand a significant
source of variation in employment relations in the auto industry. As can be
seen from Table I, the transplants now provide a sizeable percentage of
total U.S. auto assembly production, and this will increase as the expansion
plans underway in these plants are completed. Only transplants that are
co-owned by an American company have been unionized.3 The VA W
conducted an unsuccessful organizing drive in the Nissan plant, receiving
only 30.5% of the vote in an NLRB representation election in 1989 and
since has only been able to muster informal organizing efforts in the other
transplants.
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Wages -Big Three Versus the Transplants
Wage levels at the transplants vary between 80 to 90% of those at Ameri-
can-owned auto plants. For example, in January 1994 the hourly wage rate
for assemblers at the Nissan and Honda transplants were, respectively,
$15.08 and $15.65 (while they were $18.03 at General Motors). In March
1996, the hourly wage rate for assemblers at the BMW auto assembly plant
in Spartanburg, South Carolina was $17.00 (while it was $18.74 at General
4Motors ).
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Earnings Variation Across the Non-union Auto Assembly
Plants
The small difference in the hourly wage rate at the Nissan and Honda
transplants cited above is representative of the fact that wage rates have not
varied significantly across the transplants. In the transplants a variety of
performance-based pay supplement worker hourly earnings. These supple-
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ments generally range on the order of 5 to 20% oftotal worker pay although
the form of the performance pay varies across the plants. Toyota's George-
town assembly plant, for example, has two bonus systems that supplement
hourly earnings. One bonus has been tied to plant performance and has
produced flat rate bonus payments that varied between 8 to 12% of workers
total hourI.( e~mings between 1987 and 1994. (Adler 1995: 27; Mishina
1995: 16)" Smce 1990 at the Georgetown plant there has also been a
'discretionary bonus' paid annually at the discretion ofthe president ofthe
company ranging from $600 per worker in 1991 to $1400 in 1993. At
Honda's transplant operations, meanwhile, workers receive semi-annual
bonuses that are based in part on the degree to which quality goals for the
model year are being achieved. (MacDuffie, forthcoming: 28).
With regard to fringe benefits there are more substantial differences
between the compensation package provided to hourly workers in the Big
Three plants and the benefits provided in the transplants. The transplants,
for example, tend to provide significantly more modest medical insurance
and pension plans where the latter often include an individual retirement
account or defined contribution plan rather than the more elaborate defined
benefit programs found in the Big Three. Howes (1993: 46-50) and Ghilar-
ducci (1991: Table 3, p.l0) find, for example, that pension costs per
worker-hour in 1987 were $2.63 and $.95, respectively, at Ford and GM
and $.50 and $.43, respectively, at the Honda and Toyota transplants.
Table 3. Percent of the Workforce Unionized in the U.S. Auto Parts Industry
Estimates for Independent Parts Establishments in BLS IndustryWage Surveys
1963
82
1974
80-84
1983
58
1989
56
Estimates Using UAW Membership and SIC Employment Figures for Non-Big 3
Parts Plants
Source; 'The North American Auto Industry at the Onset of Continental Free Trade Negotiations,'
Economic Discussion Paper 38, U.S. DOL, Bureau of International Affairs, July 1991, Table 22.
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Work Practices at the Japanese Transplants
All the Japanese transplants use the Japanese-oriented workplace approach
including standardized jobs and problem solving teams. Given the fact that
team systems have spread unevenly throughout the Big Three assembly
plants as discussed below, the Japanese transplants use teams more exten-
sively than the average Big Three plant and are distinguished by their use
of a Japanese-oriented version of team systems. In the teams in Japanese
transplants worker autonomy is relatively limited as team systems are
oriented toward the identification and resolution of specific production
problems. Furthermore, supervisors in the Japanese transplants tend to exert
a strong role, a role that is more similar to the duties retained by supervisors
in auto plants in Japan than it is to the facilitator role played by supervisors
in American-owned assembly plants with team systems (using a joint
team-based approach). In addition, Japanese transplants use standardized
job assignments and although workers may participate in the development
or refinement ofthese job assignments, work tasks are set in detail in these
assignments and they are not, as is common in Big Three teams, subject to
frequent informal modification by team members. Team leaders in the
non-union Japanese transplants are selected by management and not
through the involvement ofteam members.
The non-union Japanese transplants lack the formal grievance proce-
dures used in the unionized American-owned auto plants to settle worker
complaints and worker-supervisor disputes. In the transplants, supervisors
are more active in settling disputes, often through informal channels.
(Graham 1995: 108) At some of the Japanese transplants more formal
procedures have been established to address worker complaints concerning
discharges. At Honda, for example, ajoint (worker and management) peer
committee reviews disciplinary discharges and has reversed a high percent-
age of these discharges (Katz and MacDuffie 1994: 214).
Five of the six nonunion Japanese transplants also maintain committees
of worker representatives (appointed by management) that provide a form
of worker representation. (PH and MacDuffie 1995: 7) Although these
committees provide avenues for communication between workers and
management, they clearly lack the independence and authority found in the
grievance procedure and negotiated committee structures in the unionized
auto plants.
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Variation Within the Unionized Auto Assembly Sector
The extent of variation in wages and work practices is even larger in the
unionized auto assembly plants. Understanding how variation in earnings
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and work practices has grown in the unionized Big Three auto assembly
plants requires an awareness of the bargaining structure that has guided
collective bargaining at the Big Three. In the traditional bargaining structure
that prevailed at the Big Three auto companies compensation is set by
national company-specific, and multi-year (since 1955they have been three
year) agreements. Some work rules such as overtime administration, em-
ployee transfer rights, and seniority guidelines are also set in the national
contracts. Local unions, in turn, negotiate plant level agreements that
supplement the national agreements. These local agreements define work
rules such as the form ofthe seniority ladder,job characteristics, job bidding
and transfer rights, health and safety standards, production standards, and
an array of other rules that guide shop floor production. The local agree-
ments do not regulate either wages or fringe benefits which are set in the
national contracts. Some indirect influences on wage determination do
occur at the plant level in the definition and modification of job classifica-
tions provided through the local agreements. Local bargaining over work
rules allows for the expression of local preferences and in the face of the
extreme economic pressures that confronted many plants from the 1980s
on, local bargaining became increasingly important and volatile.6
Earnings Determination in the Unionized Assembly Plants
Formulaic mechanisms have been utilized to set wage levels in collective
bargaining agreements in the Big Three. (Katz 1985: 14-16) The formulaic
wage-setting mechanisms traditionally included in the company-wide col-
lective bargaining agreements were an annual improvement factor (AIF)
that after the mid-1960s amounted to 3 percent per year, and a cost-of-living
adjustment (COLA) escalator that often provided full or close to full
cost-of-living protection. The importance of these formulaic mechanisms
is that they provided continuity in wage determination across time, and
across the assembly companies at any given point in time. Continuity across
the industry was provided by inter-company pattern following and by the
fact that in the plants covered by the company-wide agreements, the national
contract wage was not modified in local bargaining.
Along with increases in real hourly earnings, in the post World War Two
period, until the 1980s auto workers received steady improvements in their
fringe benefit package, and as noted above, a number ofthese fringe benefit
advances spread to the auto supplier firms and to a number of other
industries. Over the postwar period fringe benefits grew as a share of total
worker compensation.
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Inter-company variation first appeared in the hourly wages paid by the
Big Three in 1980when Chrysler, under the threat of bankruptcy, negotiated
pay concessions with the VA W that included the initial deferment, and
eventual cancellation, of COLA and AIF payments.7 Pay concessions
followed in the 1982-84 VA W contracts negotiated ahead of schedule at
GM and Ford. Concessions in the contracts negotiated at Chrysler, Ford and
GM in 1982, 1984 and 1987 included the substitution of lump sum pay
increases for the traditional AIF base pay increases (although profit sharing
was provided as a partial substitute for those base pay increases). These
contracts included some relatively small differences in the timing of pay
increases between Chrysler and the other two companies, in part as a result
of the successful efforts of the VA W to get Chrysler to repay workers for
the sacrifices they made in the 1980 contract.
The 1990-93 contracts provided identical pay increases across the Big
Three (as did the subsequent 1993-96 and 1996-1999 contracts) which
signaled a return to strict pattern bargaining in contractual base pay in-
creases and lump sum wage payments. Hourly base pay rates were stand-
ardized even earlier across the Big Three and the short life of hourly pay
differentials suggests how seriously the V AW pursued hourly base pay
standardization. Right before the start of concession bargaining at Chrysler,
as of the third quarter of 1979, hourly base pay rates had been identical at
the Big Three at $8.67 (for assemblers). By the third quarter of 1983, the
relatively large concessions at Chrysler had produced hourly base pay rates
at GM, Ford, and Chrysler, respectively, of$11.85, $11.86, and $9.85. In
the first quarter of 1985, special adjustments provided in the 1985 Chrys-
ler-VAW contract raised the Chrysler hourly base pay rate back up to the
rate being provided at that point at GM and Ford ($13.36).8
While the VA W fought hard to reinstate strict pattern following in base
pay rates and contractual increases there was much dissension created
among the work force over the fact that the introduction of profit sharing
in the early 1980s had laid the groundwork for significant variation in
worker earnings across the Big Three. The payouts of the profit sharing
plans adopted in the Big Three from 1983 on, have varied substantially, in
large part due to differences in the financial performance ofthe companies.
(See Table 2)9 The profit sharing payouts between 1983 and 1995 at GM,
Ford and Chrysler, respectively, totaled $3091, $20,545 and $16,650 (as
noted in Table 2). The annual payouts in the profit sharing plans have been
quite large in some years. For example, in 1994 at GM, Ford, and Chrysler
the respective profit sharing payouts were $550, $4,000 and $8,000 per
worker.
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Table 2. Big Three Average Worker Profit Sharing
Year Ford GM Chrysler
1983 $402 $605 $0
1984 1,993 515 0
1985 1,262 329 0
1986 2,177 0 01
1987 3,762 0 01
1988 2,874 242 725
1989 1,025 50 0
1990 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0
1992 0 0 425
1993 1,350 0 4,300
1994 4,000 550 8,000
1995 1,700 800 3,200
Total $ 20,545 $ 3,091 $ 16,650
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1 Chrysler workers received a $500 contractual payment not tied to profits.
Source: Unpublished table prepared by the UAW Research Department, February 8, 1995.
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Variation in earnings also has surfaced due to the uneven adoption of
pay-for-knowledge schemes across auto plants and the variation that exists
in the pay-for-knowledge plans that have been adopted. In some plants
workers receive $1.25 more per hour than other workers as a result of their
progression to the top of a pay-for-knowledge scale (attained through a
worker's mastery of all thejobs in their respective work area or performance
as an hourly team coordinator).
Research has shown that unions often allow more substantial variation
in fringe benefits than they allow in base pay increases presumably because
variations in fringe benefits are more difficult to calculate and thus are
somewhat less susceptible to comparisons made by the rank and file. The
VAW followed this style in its bargaining with the Big Three in that
substantial variation was accepted by the VAW in profit sharing payouts
and in the use and form of pay-for-knowledge plans at the same time the
VAW was working hard (and successfully) to eliminate variation in base
pay increases across the Big Three.
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Work Rule Variation in Unionized Auto Assembly Plants
Even greater variation now appears in the work practices used in unionized
auto assembly plants. Sizeable variation in employment relations in assem-
206 The Economic and Labour Relations Review Indw
bly plants has occurred as a result of the fact that work rules and work
organization have been modified in different ways and at a varied pace
across auto assembly plants. The threat of increased employment loss due
to either increased foreign sourcing of vehicles, plant closings due to excess
capacity, or the out sourcing of certain operations all created pressures to
lower costs and improve product quality. Ultimately, the pressure for
increased inter-plant work rule divergence came from the same source as
the pressure for inter-company pay variation, the fear that even greater
losses in employment would result if previous policies were maintained.
Companies often used investment decisions as explicit leverage for these
changes, in a strategy unions saw as 'whipsawing', i.e. forcing plants to
compete against each other through concessions.
Some of these work rule changes involved increases in the 'effort
bargain' through a tightening of production standards. Other work rule
changes include efforts to lower production costs by increasing the flexi-
bility with which labor is deployed. Common examples of the latter include
classification consolidation; limits imposed on job bidding rights; the use
of work teams to promote multiskilling through job rotation; and a pushing
down of certain responsibilities, such as quality inspection, to production
workers on the shop floor.
At plants that were threatened with imminent closing the work rules were
typically changed in a disorganized and ad hoc manner. The presence of
excess capacity allowed management to directly pit assembly plants against
one another in work rule concession bargaining. This happened frequently
from the late 1980s to the early 1990s in GM (and commonly in parts plants
across the Big Three as described later). Although the particular work rule
changes made in any assembly plant at any particular moment varied
widely, the trend across the Big Three companies over the last fifteen years
has been to gradually shift from a traditional system of work organization
to ajoint team-based approach.
The traditional work system in assembly plants involved numerous job
classification, a very heavy and highly structured role for seniority rights
injob assignments (transfers, promotions, shift preferences etc.) and a clear
separation in the responsibilities of workers and managerial employees. The
joint team-based approach, incontrast, provides greater and broader respon-
sibilities to the blue collar work force, in many instances involving workers
in production, and in some cases, even in basic business decisions. The core
of this approach is the work team typically led by an hourly team coordi-
nator. As teams spread the number of supervisors has been reduced and the
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role of the remaining supervisors shifted to a coaching and facilitating role
(although discipline did remain a key function of supervision).
The pace at which this joint team-based approach is spreading in the Big
Three varies across the Big Three. General Motors has experimented most
extensively with this approach by using initially non-union' Southern
strategy' plants as a testing ground for the concept. In the early 1980s
General Motors started spreading the team approach in its northern assem-
bly plants, first in new facilities such as the Lake Orion and Hamtramack
plants and then in the late 1980s GM management often made the use of a
team approach a necessary precondition for the survival of what were then
often redundant facilities. Ford and Chrysler were even more gradual in
their implementation in the joint team-based approach in part because
neither was building new assembly plants in the 1980s and 1990s and thus
did not have the opportunity to experiment in greenfield sites, and in part
because the GM experience of introducing teams in existing ('brownfield')
plants did not always work out so well.lo
Yet, by the early 1990s even at Ford and Chrysler's assembly plants a
joint team-based approach was spreading. Both Ford and Chrysler manage-
ment began pushing what they referred to as 'modern operating a~reements'
(MOA's) which included teams and weakened seniority rights. I
At the same time, not all Big Three assembly plants adopted team
systems. For example, at GM the Linden, Doraville, and Wilmington
12
assembly plants do not use teams as of early 1997. In a 1994 survey of a
number of U.S. auto assembly plants, MacDuffie and Pi! (1995: 10 ) find
that one-third of the Big Three assembly plants in their sample use a team
system,
Substantial variation also' appears in the programmatic details of how
teams and other features of this approach are actually being implemented.
In team plants, for example, there is wide variety in the procedures used to
select team leaders and the role that hourly team members exert in that
selection process. Some team plants use strict seniority rights to determine
who serves as the hourly team coordinator while some other teams allow
team members to directly elect their team coordinator.13 While in some
other assembly plants there is a joint labor-management selection commit-
tee that screens and interviews candidates for the team coordinator position
in a jointly-designed assessment procedure.14 Meanwhile, other plants
(such as GM's Shreveport truck assembly plant) allow the teams to chose
the team leader selection procedure and as a result the selection procedure
varies by work group across the plant. The procedures used to select team
leaders is no incidental matter. This is revealed by the fact that this selection
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procedure has been a key issue in disputes (some of which have entailed
work stoppages) at the Ford-Dearborn and other Big Three assembly
plants.IS .
There is also wide variety across plants in the specific duties performed
by team members and leaders. In some plants team members have the
authority to directly contact and visit parts vendors to resolve production
problems. A number of plants have put hourly workers on scrap and qual ity
control tasks forces and freed workers from assembly line responsibilities
to give them the time to carry out new duties.16Pay-for-knowledge has been
adopted along with teams insome plants to encourage workers to learn more
jobs in their work area and in the process become more capable of under-
standing the linkages between jobs in and across work teams. The presence
and form of pay-for-knowledge varies across plants which as noted earlier,
provides a source of earnings variation across plants in contrast to the
traditional work system that served to dampen such variation. Thus assem-
bly plants of the Big Three differ in terms of whether they use the traditional
or ajoint team-based work system and there is much variation across team
plants in terms of the specific way that teams are being introduced.
Team systems have led to increased variation in work organization and
work practices across auto plants through their operation as well as a result
of the varying structure of team administration. The purpose of team
meetings is to have workers directly address production problems as they
arise and in the process have workers provide input into plant operations in
order to settle problems or avoid them in the first place. This process
produces variety in plant operations as workers in one team adopt work
modes that either suit their preferences or respond to a particular problem
in a manner that differs from the way that workers inother teams (or workers
who reside in a plant that does not use teams) carry out their work.
Along with the variation produced by team systems there is wide
variation appearing across assembly plants in the role that workers play in
business decisions. The existence of teams work organization is part of a
deepening of worker involvement in business decisions. Yet, in many other
ways not directly linked to teams per se, there is wide variety appearing in
the role that workers and union officials are playing in plant operations. In
broad terms there is a blurring occurring in the roles that workers and
managers exercise in the plants. This blurring occurs, for example, when
workers serve on a task force to solve a specific production problem and it
also occurs when workers become part of in-sourcing, quality, scrap and
the many other sorts of joint committees that are now typically a key part
of each plant's administrative structure. In a number of Big Three assembly
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plants union officers now meet regularly with plant managers as business
issues or crises arise, in some cases this participation extends to involve-
ment in the preparation of a plant's long term business plans.
The broader involvement of workers and union officers in plant affairs
has been spurred by a decentralization occurring within the ranks of
management. As the negotiation of work practice change has intensified at
the plant level and in the face of wide plant-level (and within-plant)
variations that have appeared as a consequence of these negotiations, in
unionized settings the influence of plant level industrial relations or em-
ployee relations managers has increased relative to their corporate counter-
parts. In addition, the involvement of operating managers (such as
production managers or production superintendents) in employee relations
matters has increased in part through the reduced role that the formal
grievance procedure is playing in conflict resolution and the increasing role
of informal discussions held between operating managers and workers (and
union officers). Some of these discussions arise out of the natural operation
of teams, while others occur as result of the broader roles workers are
playing in problem solving forums or through the activities of the various
joint committees operating on the shop floor.
In some plants a formal 'area' management structure is spurring the
decentralization of industrial relations down to the shop floor. In these
plants typically three or four key operational areas are designated and
reporting lines are adjusted to fit these areas rather than the traditional plant
hierarchy. In the traditional management structure labor relations staff
report upward to the plant industrial relations (or personnel) director and
not to an operating manager. In an area management structure, in contrast,
the employee relations support staff report directly to an area operating
manager and report in a matrix manner to an employee relations (or
industrial relations) director. Area management represents a business-unit
style of operation at the plant level and is intended to bring an awareness
and responsiveness to cost and profit pressures down to the work area. This
concept, used in plants such as Chrysler's Jefferson Avenue assembly plant,
is leading to a reorganization of the employee relations function within
management as well as a broader involvement of workers and union officers
in plant operations.
The purpose of area management is to have the operations leaders of the
work area take on more direct responsibility for employee relations issues
and also have the employee relations staff learn about and respond more
directly to business needs. In the process the staff function of industrial
relations is being shifted downward inside the plant and also being diffused
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to operating managers who traditionally did not get directly involved in
employee relations matters.
With this shift to area management and other more informal changes,
management faces a number of human resource issues such as how to
reshape reporting and training lines accordingly. For instance, the career
development of industrial relations staff (and that of operating managers)
has to be reshaped to accommodate the fact that industrial relations staff
now are required to interact more extensively with operating managers and
less often with higher level staff within their own functional area.
The most extensive decentralization of employment relations in a Big
Three assembly plant (and perhaps the most extensive anywhere) occurs at
the Saturn Corporation. Notably, this decentralization has led to extensive
involvement by workers and union representatives in business issues at
Saturn.17 The organizational structure of Saturn includes a number of
committees, each of which includes worker or union representation.
(Rubenstein, Bennett, and Kochan, 1992) At the shop floor level there are
work units made up of 6 to 15 workers and a single production worker
classification. Work units participate as a problem solving group and make
decisions concerning job assignments, job rotation, overtime, and recruit-
ment. Workers perform a variety of job tasks in their work area and also
perform some of the planning and control tasks traditionally carried out by
supervisors. At the top level of Saturn is a 'strategic advisory committee'
that engages in long run business planning and includes the president ofthe
VA W local union.
One ofthe most novel aspects of shop floor industrial relations at Saturn
derives from the fact that the VA W contract governing the Saturn complex
has no local seniority agreement. Thus, there is no formal role for seniority
in matters such as job assignments, job bidding, overtime, and shift assign-
ments. Most ofthese decisions are made informally by the work units (i.e.,
by workers themselves). Perhaps most revolutionary is the presence of
union and management 'partners' who co-manage decisions within the
Saturn complex. Although the union does not have a formal place on the
GM Board of Directors which makes the ultimate decisions concerning
Saturn's investments, products, and pricing, the strong role played by union
partners at Saturn gives the union a level of involvement in decision making
that is unparalleled in contemporary American industrial relations.
In a number of ways Saturn provides an extreme example of the work
practices found in thejoint team-based approach. Compared to Saturn, most
auto plants (and plants in other industries as well) have less dramatically
meshed worker and manager roles. At the same time the existence of Saturn,
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and the fact that other plants have in their own ways restructured work and
labor and management roles, adds to the rich nature of the variety found
across joint team-based plants.
Technology, managers' efforts to preserve their own role and control,
and other factors still constrain the options available to workers and unions.
Nevertheless, the spread of teams and other forms of participatory work
reorganization are producing a significant increase in variation in work
practices particularly where teams and the like are being linked to a
decentralization within management structures.
Industrial Relations in the Auto Parts Sector
The Boundaries of the 'Internal' and 'Independent' Auto Parts
Sector
Variation in employment relations has increased in the auto parts sector in
general terms in a manner similar to developments in the assembly sector.
At the same time, a number offactors differ in these two sectors, in part due
to differences in the timing and intensity of non-union employment growth.
The 'internal' parts operations of GM, Ford, and Chrysler are the largest
producers in the auto parts industry accounting for approximately 60% of
the shipments in the motor vehicle parts and accessories industry. The
internal parts plants follow the same bargaining structure as the assembly
plants and nearly all are covered by the master company agreements
negotiated between the Big Three companies and the VA W.18Since they
are covered by company-wide collective bargaining agreements, wage rates
and fringe benefits at the internal parts plants are identical to those at the
Big Three assembly plants.
In recent years Big Three company negotiators have frequently com-
plained about the competitive pressures confronting the internal parts plants
and have expressed the desire to create separate lower tier pay rates for the
internal parts operations. The VA W has successfully resisted these de-
mands, but the union has been less successful in constraining the outsour-
cing of parts production and the negotiation of work rule concessions. In
line with the Big Three-VA W bargaining structure, there are separate local
(often plant) agreements at the internal parts operations and from the early
I980s on there were major concessions negotiated in the work practices at
the internal parts plants.
Substantial variation now appears in the work practices in the internal
parts plants as some of these plants use teams and the form of teams and
other methods of worker and union involvement in decision making also
-
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vary enormously across these plants. Major changes have occurred in work
practices due to the enormous bargaining leverage management gained in
the supplier sector as a consequence of outsourcing opportunities and the
fact that alternative suppliers are often non-union with compensation that
is significantly below that in internal parts plants.
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Declining Unionization of Independent Auto Suppliers
Since the growth of non-union competition has become such a significant
factor in the auto parts industry, it is worth examining how non-union
growth has occurred. The' independent' parts companies, companies that
produce auto parts but do not assemble those parts into final vehicles, were
heavily, although never completely, organized with a lag behind the unioni-
zation of the Big Three.19 The percentage of the supplier plants with a
majority of their workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement rose
from 50-55% in 1940 to 95% in 1957 and unionization then produced a
substantial rise in the earnings of organized workers. Mean earnings in the
supplier firms relative to earnings in assembly firms rose from 87.5% to
95.3% from 1940 to 1957. (Katz 1987)
Union coverage in the independent parts plants fell substantially from
the mid 1970s on as illustrated by the figures in Table 3. The fall in
unionization was a major cause of the decline in the earnings of workers in
the independent parts firms relative to the earnings of workers in auto
assembly plants. (See Table 4) Relative earnings declines occurred earlier
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Table 4. Worker Earnings in the U.S. Auto Parts Industry Relative to Auto
Assembly Plant Earnings
Average Hourly Earnings in Independent Parts Suppliers Relative to Earnings in
Auto Assembly Firms
1957
5Q-499 workers 86
500 or more workers N.A.
1000 or more workers 99
1963
77
97
101
1974
67
85
94
1983
62
75
N.A.
1989
56
66
N.A.
slons
respc
1985
Relative Hourly Earnings by Size of Establishment
Source: All of these figures are from BlS industry wage surveys. The figures are reported in, 'The North
American Auto Industry at the Onset of Continental Free Trade Negotiations,' Economic Discussion Paper
38, U.S. DOL, Bureau of International Affairs, July 1991, Table 24.
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and have beenmuch larger in small firms. These earnings declines are
probably linked to the fact that unionization declines were particularly large
in small auto supplier firms. Many of the small parts finns pursued an
employment relations strategy which entailed either low wage or bureau-
cratic non-union employment practices.
The push for concessions at the independent parts firms from the early
1980s on was exacerbated by the fact that independent parts firms faced all
the pressures that were impinging on the auto assemblers, lacked the
financial resources of the assemblers, and faced more substantial growth in
low wage domestic non-union competitors. Even in the face of a set of
common pressures, substantial diversity emerged in the employment rela-
tions strategies pursued by independent parts firms, diversity influenced by
business and union strategies and the degree to which new investments, or
the lack thereof, gave management an interest in work reorganization and/or
bargaining leverage.
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Earnings Variation Across Independent Parts Firms
Negotiation outcomes at the Budd and Dana Corporations illustrate how
the independent suppliers pulled away from the Big Three-VA W pattern
and the cross-company variations created by this process. The VA W has
beenthe dominant union at these companies since the later 1940salthough
a growing fraction of these company's plants operate on a nonunion basis.
In their unionized plants over the post World War II period, Budd and Dana
followed the pattern setting agreements at OM and Ford through the 1979
negotiations. Then in 1982, both supplier finns negotiated concessionary
agreements with the VA W, and some of these concessions went beyond
those negotiated at OM and Ford in the spring of 1982.
From 1983 to 1985 the contracts negotiated at Budd and Dana included
deeper concessions than the agreements negotiated at the Big Three and
also differed from one another in the timing and manner of these conces-
sions. At Budd, employment had continued to decline after 1983. In
response to this economic pressure, contracts with the VA W at Budd in
1985 included additional concessions and did not follow the 1984 pattern
setting agreements at OM and Ford. In 1987 and then again in 1991, Budd
further differentiated itself from the Big Three pattern by negotiating a four
year agreement with lump sum and base pay increases that were one to two
percent per year lower than the terms of the Big Three contracts. Profit
sharing never has been included in either the Budd or Dana contracts,
another important way in which these contracts differed from the Big Three
settlements. The most recent VA W labor contracts at Budd and Dana differ
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even more substantially from one another and from the UA W's contracts
with the Big Three auto companies.
Thus, the trend from the late] 980s on was for the independent auto
supplier companies to gain deeper pay concessions than those being nego-
tiated in this period at the Big Three companies. In addition, important
differences appeared across the independent suppliers in the pay and fringe
benefit concessions they each gained.
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Work Practice Variation in the Independent Parts Plants
Corporate strategy and the extent to which new (often nonunion) invest-
ments gave management an interest in work reorganization and bargaining
leverage influenced the evolution of work practices within independent auto
parts companies in a manner not very different from developments in the
assembly sector. As a result, there are now sizeable cross-company and
cross-plant variation within auto supplier firms in their work practices and
their relationships with unions (where union representation persists).
The Magna Corporation, for example, aggressively opened a number of
small non-union plants in the 1980s and adopted a variant of a human
resource management approach in those plants which includes team sys-
tems. (Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and McKersie ]994: ]21) TRW, in
contrast, used acquisitions and investments (and disinvestment) to gradu-
ally transform itself over the post World War II period from a company with
significant union representation to the current low level of union repre-
sentation in its auto parts plants. In its non-union plants TRW uses team
systems (and frequently pay-for-knowledge plans) along with other prac-
tices that fit the human resource management pattern. TRW' s approach is
noteworthy in the high degree of independence it grants to plant managers
regarding work practice implementation. This decentralized approach to
employment relations at TRW helps isolate the existing union operations.
from the growing non-union operations in the company. At the company's
union plants generally a traditional (arms-length) employment pattern has
been maintained.
A different corporate strategy toward work practices has appeared in the
Budd Corporation's unionized auto parts plants which have been incremen-
tally modifying their traditional work practices. These incremental modifi-
cations involve the introduction of on-line and off-line quality circles and
increased direct communication between management (particularly super-
visors) and workers. Notably, this incrementalist approach lacks a more
radical restructuring of work organization or worker roles. Yet, at the same
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nge
time Budd has been experimenting more aggressively with union avoidance
in a greenfield non-union plant in Kentucky which utilizes a human resource
management-type employment pattern. Adding to this diversity within
Budd is the movement toward a joint team-based employment pattern at
Budd's Phoenix plant (this movement started in the late 1980s). (Walton,
Cutcher-Gershenfeld and McKersie 1994: 151)
Within the auto parts sector generally, as in the assembly sector, the
spread of joint team-based or HRM approaches varies across and within
companies. Generally, management has found it easier to gain concessions
in parts plants where employment has been declining or where they could
make credible threats of further employment declines. Another similarity
with developments in the assembly sector arises from the fact that there is
greater use of these workplace initiatives in new greenfield parts plants and
a tendency for more incremental modification of traditional labor relations
systems in older brownfield parts sites?O
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Problems From Increased Variation and the Associated
Decentralization of Industrial Relations
The local branches of the UAW have ended up with a lot of discretion
regarding workplace issues. This is spurring experimentation and variety
in local work rule changes. Yet, the absence of forceful national coordina-
tion of work rule bargaining also opens the door to managerial-led whip-
sawing in which plants are played off against one another in survival
contests when the presence of excess capacity and production cutbacks
shifts bargaining power to management.
Management typically initiates the workplace changes discussed in this
chapter in an effort to improve costs, quality, and production flexibility in
their plants. Data from assembly plants suggests that on average Japanese-
oriented work practices have led to improvements in production costs and
product quality. (MacDuffie 1995)Yet, there are a number of U.S. assembly
plants that have attained relatively favorable production costs without
resorting to such methods. (Babson 1995) These plants have retained many
traditional work and industrial relations practices, but have modified those
practices incrementally by gradually increasing, through informal channels,
the amount of worker (and union) involvement in plant operations. In some
cases increased worker input has come in these plants through the height-
ened use of existing suggestion programs. In these' incrementalist' plants
job classifications have often been simplified and reduced although not
through the introduction of team methods. Cost improvements also have
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come in the incrementalist plants (as in the Japanese-oriented plants)
through changes in management methods that reduce the number of parts
and simplify the assembly process as well as through improvements in
technology (the same is true for plants that radically restructured work
organization).
The successes achieved in plants that adopted at incremental approach
to work restructuring have created doubts within the ranks of both managers
and union officers as to whether more extreme work practices changes are
necessary in order to maintain profitability and employment. (Lee 1996)
These doubts have been enhanced by the fact that more radical work
practice reform efforts did not always work out well in the auto assembly
sector. Research suggests, for example, that the introduction offormal team
systems in GM assembly plants in the early and mid 1980s led to deterio-
rations, and not the expected improvements, in productivity on average even
though there were a few assembly plants in GM where team systems did
lead to substantial performance improvements. (Katz, Kochan, and Keefe
1987) The inability of teams to always improve productivity may have been
.
associated with the fact that team plants did not in all cases lead to
substantive increases in worker involvement in decision making and work-
ers and unions in many of the plants resented that they had agreed to
introduce teams only as a result of managements' threats to otherwise close
the plant. Incrementalism in changing employment relations also was
promoted by the fact that the financial success ofFord in the late 1980s and
Chrysler in the early 1990s seems to have rest primarily on successful
product design and not as a result of particularly successful work practice
. ... 21InItiatives.
Thus, managers and unionists were not convinced by the mid 1990s that
work practice initiatives were essential for financial success and they were
confused as to whether and how changes in work practices would affect
economic performance. The presence of this confusion helps explain why
there has been (and continues to be) so much variation in the workplace
i.nitiatives being pushed by management. Given that corporate (and central
union) officials are uncertain of the advantages of a particular work practice,
the initiative for change is typically left up to plant-level actors. This shifts
the locus for change to the plant level.
Overall, management benefited greatly from the shift toward locally-
driven workplace initiatives as these initiatives have led to lower costs and
improved product quality, even in the face of the parties' confusion regard-
ing the sources of improvements. Yet, when demand for Big Three products
improved and capacity constraints tightened in the early 1990s, at some
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plants management lost its bargaining leverage and localized bargaining
turned back into a process of union-led whipsawing. This was well illus-
trated by events in the early and mid 1990s at GM when the VA W conducted
a series of strikes at parts plants. A strike at the Dayton brake plant of GM
in the spring of 1996 was the most well publicized ofthese strikes as it led
to the closure of nearly all ofGM's assembly plants. The specific issue that
precipitated each of these strikes varied, but the common thrust of these
strikes was efforts by the UA W to acquire more extensive employment
security guarantees at the plant level.
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Increased Decentralization and Diversity in Other
Industries as Well
Variation in employment relations is growing in the United States as a
product of the growth in non-union employment and the existence of a
variety of union and non-union employment patterns. Similar trends are
apparent in other parts of the U.S. economy (and in other industrialized
economies). (Darbishire and Katz, 1997) The auto industry is distinguished
by their high levels of union representation (which as elsewhere are declin-
ing) but not by the processes through which variation in employment
relations is appearing. The breakdown of pattern bargaining across firms
and industries in the union sector, and the spread of contingent forms of pay
and associated greater reliance on individualized rewards are all contribut-
ing to increased variation in pay. These changes in pay practices have
contributed to the unusually large increases in income inequality in the
United States. (see Oarbishire and Katz, 1997)
While team systems have spread and operate as a critical part of the
sophisticated HRM and joint team-based patterns, more traditional forms
of work organization continue in firms following the low wage, bureau-
cratic, and New Deal employment patterns. Meanwhile, work practices
variation is being spurred by a decentralization in managerial and corporate
structures. Management is eager to pursue this decentralization and link it
to more direct involvement ofthe workforce in business decisions and new
communication strategies. However, in union settings when bargaining
power has shifted back towards labor's advantage, decentralization has not
so clearly worked to management's advantage. Furthermore, the labor
movement has occasionally been able to use decentralized bargaining to
whipsaw management, more often than not, union weakness has been both
a precondition and consequence of collective bargaining decentralization.
Decentralization, more direct management-employee communication, and
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increased employee (and union) involvement in business decisions thus all
have contributed to the wide variation appearing in work practices.
No one employment pattern is dominating in the United States, in part
because management is unsure of the performance advantages of the
various employment patterns. Management's indecisiveness has been fu-
eled by the mixed objective evidence regarding performance effects and the
fact that the effects of employment practices seem to be linked so closely
to business (and labor) strategies. What is most striking about U.S. devel-
opments is the wide variation appearing within and across employment
patterns and the auto industry provides a clear illustration of this growing
variation.
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Notes
1. 30 and out pensions provide that a worker can retire and receive pension benefits
after 30 years of service no matter what their age.
2. We were not able to identify official Big Three employment or UAW membership
statistics. The figures cited in the paper are from unpublished UAW series,
various years.
3. Although the unionized Mitsubishi plant in Illinois is now solely owned by a
Japanese company it was at one time owned jointly by Mitsubishi and the
Chrysler Corporation.
4.These figures are the maximum hourly wage rates for production workers. When
first hired workers at the transplants and at Big Three auto plants receive lower
hourly wage rates that are increased step-wise over time according to fixed
schedules. The transplant figures cited in the text were collected at the respective
plants during interviews while the General Motors figures are reported in an
unpublished wage series maintained by the UAW.
5. The company has plans to shift to a bonus based on a combination of individual
and plant performance, but Georgetown managers are hesitant to introduce
individual variation into the bonus system.The latter was conveyed to Harry Katz
in a personal communication with Paul Adler in March 1996.
6. In this system the grievance procedure with binding third party arbitration serves
as the end point of contract administration although disputes concerning produc-
tion standards, new job rates, and health and safety issues are not resolved
through recourse to grievance arbitration. Rather, the union retains the right to
strike over these matters.
7. These concessions were negotiated in three rounds of bargaining conducted
under pressure from the U.S. Congresswhich hadjust agreed to provideChrysler
with loanguarantees.
8. These figures are from an unpublishedwage and COLA series maintained by the
Research Department of the UAW.
9. For a while there were differences in the way profit sharing was calculated in the
Big Three profit sharing plans. Under pressure from the UAW, in response to
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pressures from disgruntled workers at GM, the profitsharing formulas were
standardized across the three companies.
10. See Katz, Kochan and Keefe (1987) for evidence regarding the problems GM
had with the introduction of teams.
11. Chrysler management also has been pushing 'progressive operating agree-
ments' which differfrom the modern operating agreements in that these plants
do not change work organization and worker and union roles as formally as MOA
plants. (MacDuffie 1994: 82)
12. See (Milkman 1997) for discussion of developments at Linden.
13. The GM Tarrytown and Arlington assembly plants use strict seniority to select
hourly team leaders.
14. In this procedure seniority is determinant if candidates have equal assessment
scores. The GM Lansing agreement outlines such a procedure.
15. Disputes over team leader selection have occurred at transplants such as the
Ford-Mazda Flat Rock and Ford Dearborn plants (Babson 1995).
16. Time clocks and factory gate restrictions have been eliminated in a number of
plants to convey a spirit of increased worker autonomy and responsibility.
17. Saturn, a subsidiary of GM, is a complex of plants in Spring Hill, Tennessee.
18. In a small percentage of Big Three auto parts plants workers are represented
by unions other than the UAW such as the IUE or the lAM.
19. The largest independent auto parts producing firms as of the mid 1990s are:
Borg Warner, Budd, TRW, and Rockwell International.
20. These adjustments fit the pattern outlined in Katz and MacDuffie (1994:
205-208). Also see Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1994) for evidence regarding the
diversity in employment relations surfacing across auto suppliers.
21. In the mid and late 1980s Ford benefited from the success of the Taurus,
Explorer and a number of strong selling truck models while Chrysler's success
in the 1990 was driven in large part by the success of their mini-van, the LH
model, and a number of truck lines.
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